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ABSTRACT 
Hobbes’ education in the literary culture of English Renaissance humanism has been overlooked as an important tradi-
tion in understanding his position in Early Modern Philosophy. Against the traditional readings of Hobbes’ conception of 
language as a sequel to Medieval nominalism, I will argue that Hobbes’ education in the literary culture of Renaissance 
humanism and his subsequent developments in this tradition would have allowed him to consider philosophical problems 
raised by new science in an original way and, thus, to introduce his innovative conception of language as the core of his 
solution to the problem of social and natural orders.Keywords 
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Sobre el origen de la concepción del lenguaje en Hobbes:  
la cultura literaria del humanismo renacentista en Inglaterra
RESUMEN
La educación de Hobbes en la cultura literaria del humanismo renacentista en Inglaterra no ha sido considerada como 
una tradición importante en la interpretación de su posición en la temprana filosofía moderna. En contra de las interpre-
taciones tradicionales de la concepción del lenguaje de Hobbes como una continuación del nominalismo medieval, sos-
tengo que la educación de Hobbes en la cultura literaria del humanismo renacentista y sus desarrollos en esta tradición 
le habrían permitido considerar los problemas filosóficos generados por el surgimiento de la ciencia moderna de una 
forma original y, en consecuencia, introducir su novedosa concepción del lenguaje como el centro de su solución a los 
problemas del orden social y natural.
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Though words be the signs we have of one another’s opinions and 
intentions; yet, because the equivocation of them is so frequent 
according to the diversity of contexture, and of the company 
wherewith they go (which the presence of him that speaketh, 
our sight of his actions, and conjecture of his intentions, must 
help to discharge us of): it must be extreme hard to find out the 
opinions and meanings of those men that are gone from us along 
ago, and have left no other signification thereof but their books; 
which cannot possibly be understood without history enough to 
discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without 
great prudence to observe them (Hobbes 1969, 39). 
The core of Hobbes’ conception of language is 
the possibility of creating things with words, such as 
sciences or even the Commonwealth, more than repre-
senting them. According to this point of view, sciences 
are linguistic artifacts created by human beings to 
solve specific problems; sciences are neither reflec-
tions nor capsules grasping a reality outside us, but 
useful tools for creating, preserving, and improving 
human welfare. As I have argued elsewhere, this spe-
cific conception of language fitted into the demon-
strative requirements of Hobbes’ mathematical ideal 
of knowledge and is closely related to his mechanical 
conception of reality (Orozco-Echeverri 2010). In this 
sense, Hobbes’ treatment of language appears as his 
epistemological justification of the mathematical 
and mechanical traditions of thought growing in the 
early seventeenth century, which flourished in what 
was labeled the “new science.”
Traditional accounts of Hobbes’ conception of language 
have related his treatment to the nominalist tradition 
of William of Ockham and Jean Buridan;1 even some ac-
counts of nominalism list Hobbes as one of its leading 
modern exponents (Largeault 1971). According to my re-
search, Hobbes’ treatment of language can conceptually 
be related to nominalism, but historically we have no 
evidence of Hobbes’ strong engagement with the texts of 
Medieval nominalist authors. Indeed, as far as we know, 
he was not very impressed by Scholasticism when he 
studied at Oxford, and we have no evidence of his hav-
ing read Ockham or other nominalist authors. Yet I do 
not deny the possible influence, via Pierre Gassendi and 
Francis Bacon, for example,2 of Medieval conceptions of 
language. However, it is striking that another tradition, 
to which I will refer in this paper, has not been considered 
seriously as an important framework for understanding 
1 See, for example, Zarka (1999) and Bernhardt (1985). The comparison 
of Hobbes’ conception of language with Ockham’s goes back at least to 
Leibniz, when he says: “If an astronomer can account for the celestial 
phenomena with few presuppositions, that is with simple motions 
only, his hypothesis is certainly to be preferred to that of one who needs 
many orbs variously intertwined to explain the heavens. From this the 
nominalists have deduced the rule that everything in the world can be 
explained without any reference to universals and real forms. Nothing 
is truer than this opinion, and nothing is more worthy of a philosopher 
of our own time, so much that, I believe, Ockham himself was not more 
of a nominalist than is Thomas Hobbes now, although I confess that 
Hobbes seems to me to be an ultranominalist” (Leibniz 1923, 427–428).
2 Bacon’s critique of the misuses of language is evidently influential in 
Hobbes’ own conceptions. For more details on Bacon’s conception and 
its influence on this topic in the seventeenth century, see Harrison 
(2007), especially 172–185.
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Hobbes’ conception of language. Indeed, the tradition in 
which Hobbes was educated must be considered to under-
stand the origins of his conception of language: the liter-
ary culture of Renaissance humanism in England. In fact, 
Hobbes was educated in the Classics more than in Philoso-
phy or Divinity, and some of his most important works 
are evidently contributions to the literary tradition of the 
English Renaissance. Thus, Hobbes was not only educat-
ed in this tradition, but he also heavily contributed to it 
with important works; he was also a practitioner. 
In this paper, I will argue that Hobbes’ education in the 
literary culture of Renaissance humanism and his sub-
sequent developments in this tradition would have al-
lowed him to consider philosophical problems raised by 
new science in an original way and, thus, to introduce 
his innovative conception of language as the core of his 
solution to the problem of social and natural orders.3 
The literary culture  
of the English Renaissance
Because of the complexity of the topic and the growing 
specialized studies in this field, I will offer only a general 
outlook on the English Renaissance, which I hope will be 
enough to locate the setting of Hobbes’ education and his 
early intellectual context.4 During the sixteenth century, 
many English communities experienced growing interest 
in reading and commenting on classical treatises in Rhet-
oric and, similarly to Continental Renaissances, re-reading 
Greek and Roman classics, which, more than erudite and 
academic works, were conceived as the guideline for new 
educational methods and as the framing of a new society. 
Erasmus of Rotterdam himself had sketched some mod-
els of curricula; but it was Juan Luis Vives, who arrived in 
England in 1523, who further developed more ambitious 
methods of education, which were first exposed in his De 
tradentis disciplinis of 1531. The most influential work in Eng-
land, however, was Thomas Elyot’s The Book named the Gov-
ernor, published in the same year as Vives’s. Written in the 
same spirit as Continental humanism, Elyot’s book was 
committed in general terms to the bonnæ litteræ, that is, to 
3 Recently, Philip Pettit has suggested Hobbes’ conception of language 
(mainly his artifactual character) is the key to understanding the 
philosophical significance of his political theory. As it has been ap-
preciated, my own approach, emphasis, and interest in Hobbes’ con-
ception of language are different. Cf. Pettit (2008).
4 For more details on the English Renaissance, see the excellent com-
panions by Kinney (2000) and Hattaway (2003). My own overview is 
heavily based on those materials. On the general context of litera-
ture, education, and politics, Levin (2008) has been useful. 
the ideal that the study of Greek and Roman letters could 
effect an important change in the culture of the ruling 
classes as when these texts were the rule in Classical An-
tiquity.5 Humanism, however, was considered by Elyot as 
a separate way; in Robert Matz’s words: “For Elyot […] the 
independent authority of bonæ litteræ represents a separate 
space for learning that is neither clerkly, academic, legal 
nor medical. Humanist study becomes instead a form of 
governance itself, both a prerequisite for governing and a 
body of knowledge that will instruct – and hence govern – 
the governing class” (Matz 2004, 30).
In this sense, and following the typical style of the Eras-
mians, the ultimate goal of this humanist education is 
mastery of the studia liberalia or liberal sciences, epito-
mized in the motto ‘vir bonum atque dicendi peritus’ (the 
man who is not only good but also skilled in speaking). 
According to this view, it was not necessary to abandon 
the traditional trivium and quadrivium of the Scholastic cur-
riculum, but the student should be trained as well in five 
traditional disciplines—rhetoric, poetry, history, and 
moral philosophy (the traditional disciplines in the rhe-
torical education)6—and in grammar (Greek and Latin). 
The study of these disciplines, then, amounted to care-
ful study, translation, and comment on Greek and Roman 
classics in each field. Roger Ascham, the private tutor to 
Elizabeth I before she became queen, specified in his The 
Scholemaster, published in 1591, the way to study the clas-
sical texts: the reading of a Greek author was compared 
–following Quintilian’s method of comparison– to his 
Roman version in genre, for example, Homer to Virgil in 
epic, or Thucydides to Sallust in history, or Plato to Cicero 
in moral philosophy. After making the comparison, the 
student was required to write an original composition in 
his vernacular tongue. This exercise of creative imitation 
aimed for the student to become as learned and eloquent 
in his own language as the best writers were in Greek and 
Latin. The result of this exercise would be the creation of 
habits of thought, feeling, and speech similar to the best 
in Ancient times. This humanist education, however, 
had the goal of improving vir civilis or civic virtue, as under-
stood by Cicero in the context of the Roman Republic and 
as exposed by Quintilian, following him (Skinner 1996). 
Elyot, as well as Ascham and other authors of Tudor 
England, detailed the order of study of the scientiæ and 
the readings the student should follow, beginning in 
5 For a general –and useful– analysis of the circumstances and details 
of Elyot’s book, see Matz (2004), especially pp. 25–55.
6 The disciplines, texts, and their order of study are detailed in Quin-
tilian (1920a y 1920b), who follows in this Cicero’s opinions.
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the grammar schools. The model was highly influen-
tial during the late sixteenth century and, particularly 
during the 1590s, was in widespread use, but because of 
the political and social circumstances of early-seventeenth-
century England, was ultimately overthrown.7 Prob-
ably as a consequence of this model, late-sixteenth and 
early-seventeenth-century England saw an impressive 
increase in the publication and circulation of Greek 
and Latin works. At the same time, this humanist 
education, with its emphasis on “creative imitation,” 
improved English as a language more adequate for ex-
pressing, creating, and feeling as has been pointed in 
reference to the works of Christopher Marlowe, Ben Jon-
son, Sir Thomas More, Sir Francis Bacon, John Donne, 
Edmund Spencer, William Shakespeare, Thomas Kyd, 
and the big names associated with the Elizabethan era. 
Indeed, one of the main characteristics of these authors 
is the invention of the English language for poetry, lit-
erature, and theater, coining new words from other 
languages, including Greek and Latin, but also French 
and Spanish.8 We can include Hobbes in the spirit of 
this age, when Richard Tuck claims that,
Hobbes created English-language philosophy. Before 
his work, there was little written in English on the 
more technical areas of philosophy – on metaphysics, 
physics, and even ethics. Only Richard Hooker can 
count as a precursor, and then merely in one limited 
branch of philosophy, that of jurisprudence. But after 
Hobbes, there was no area of human enquiry deemed 
inappropriate for the English language. This was a 
remarkable achievement, and one which we tend to 
take for granted; but it was possible for Hobbes only 
because he had a thorough mastery of the contempo-
rary debates in the traditional language of philoso-
phy –Latin – and in the new language – French. He 
wrote continually in both Latin and English, and 
we cannot really understand his finest achievement 
(which was to produce, in Leviathan, the first unques-
tionably great philosophical work in our language) 
without surveying the full range of his intellectual 
activity (Tuck 2002, n.p.).
Although Tuck does not explain the origin of this impor-
tant contribution by Hobbes to philosophy and to the Eng-
lish language, we can locate his contribution in the same 
creative impulse that originated the abovementioned lit-
erary, theatrical, and poetical works.
7 For more details, see Brink (2003) and Skinner (1996).
8 For further analysis on this point, see Blake (2003). 
Hobbes’ Renaissance education:  
the studia humanitatis
The most important biographical essays on Hobbes have 
pointed out his early education in a typical Tudor human-
ist curriculum.9 Some scholars have tried to show that 
Hobbes’ early commitment as translator is a minor and not 
very significant period in his intellectual development be-
fore he found geometry and optics and became interested 
in moral and political philosophy, as is manifest in the Ele-
ments of Law and De Cive after 1640, or they simply omit the 
references to previous works.10 Quentin Skinner’s detailed 
studies, in contrast, have traced the continuity between 
the main subjects and ideals of Hobbes’ early humanist 
readings of Roman classics, such as Cicero and Quintilian, 
and the major topics developed in De Cive and dominantly 
in Leviathan (Skinner 1996 and 2002). However, Skinner has 
pictured as well a Hobbes closely related not only to the 
reading but also to the typical practices of English human-
ists such as translating classical authors and writing poet-
ry, history, and compendiums for teaching (Skinner 1996). 
Catherine Wilson, in her recent study on Epicureanism at 
the Origins of Modernity, has persuasively argued in favor 
of the strong influence of Epicurean topics on moral and 
natural philosophy, particularly of Lucretius, in Hobbes’ 
mature works (Wilson 2008). According to my reading, 
as has been mentioned above, Hobbes’ education and his 
early works on humanist tradition provided him with not 
only the major topics of his late moral and political philos-
ophy and some useful argumentative resources but also an 
important set of conceptions from which he would shape 
his claim that language is a human ability to create, rather 
than to represent, a non-human reality.11
As I have mentioned above, it is widely accepted that 
Hobbes received a typical education in the literary culture 
of Renaissance humanism when he attended grammar 
9 Malcolm (2002), Tuck (2002), Skinner (1996), Martinich (1999). As 
early as 1952, Leo Strauss pointed out the humanism influence on 
Hobbes’ early education (Strauss 1996).
10 For example, Brandt (1928), Goldsmith (1966), and particularly the 
Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, edited by Sorell (1996), which does not 
include more references to Hobbes’ early development than those 
outlined in Malcolm’s contribution or the recent book by Tuck (2002), 
which in his second part explaining Hobbes’ works divides them into 
Science, Ethics, Politics, and Religion, but makes no mention of his 
works in the humanist tradition.
11 Skinner’s suggestion of the influence of Hobbes’ early education are pre-
eminently oriented to the topics of argumentative resources and moral 
philosophy: “Hobbes is revealed not as a product of the scientific culture 
to which he later contributed so extensively, but rather as a student and 
exponent of the predominantly literary culture of humanism.”(Skinner 
2002, 38). Wilson (2008) adds to Skinner’s studies topics in natural phi-
losophy and the influence of Epicurean conception of the world.
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school. There, we are told, he learned Latin and Greek 
and developed the exercises of the basic elements of the 
studia humanitatis: grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and 
moral philosophy.12 Aubrey’s anecdotal life of Hobbes tells 
us he was a very advanced student who quickly mastered 
Latin and Greek: “[B]efore he went to the University, he 
had turned Euripides’ Medea out of Greek into Latin iam-
bics, which he presented to his master,” Robert Latimer, 
a young man who was nearly twenty years old when he 
returned from Oxford and established a private school 
at Westport, which Hobbes attended “in the evening till 
nine o’clock.” Latimer was, according to Aubrey, “a good 
Græcian scholar” (Aubrey 1998, 150).13 After his early edu-
cation, Hobbes was admitted to Magdalen Hall at Oxford, 
where for the first time he faced the traditional curricu-
lum shaped by Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy. 
We have scattered information about Hobbes’ studies at 
Oxford, but we may conjecture, in sharp contrast to Des-
cartes and other seventeenth-century thinkers, there 
were no significant findings and surprises in the curricu-
lum for him. Hobbes himself, in his Vita, mentions he at-
tended lessons and exercises in logic, but he soon stopped 
going to his classes in physics because he “turned instead 
to more agreeable studies, and began in particular to re-
volve in my mind once more the books to which I had ear-
lier been introduced, but which I still did not know very 
well” (Hobbes 1845a, lxxxvii). These books to which he 
was introduced before were the Greek and Roman clas-
sics which led him to meet with Robert Latimer. In fact, 
Hobbes’ decision not to pursue a master of arts (a requi-
site for remaining at the university) or to develop a career 
in the Church, his immediate intellectual development 
after completing his bachelor of arts, and his early occu-
pation as secretary and tutor to an aristocratic family (a 
very typical way of life of a Renaissance humanist, rather 
than a position at the court, more adequate to natural 
philosophers or even to mathematicians):14 all these ele-
12 Quentin Skinner has shown in detail how Hobbes was educated in 
this tradition when he attended grammar school, how this educa-
tion was interrupted by the traditional scholastic curriculum he 
found at Oxford, and, finally, the way Hobbes undertook in his 
early period (before the 1640s) work on the studia humanitatis and con-
tributed to it. Cf. Skinner (1996).
13 See also Martinich (1999).
14 Skinner has widely detailed the implication of Hobbes’ appointments 
as secretary and tutor to the Devonshire family as an undoubted sign 
of his commitment to Renaissance humanism as a cultural practice 
different from a career at the university. Cf. Skinner (1996): “Perhaps 
the most obvious reflection of Hobbes’ humanist allegiances can be ob-
served in his choice of career […] the most usual pattern of employment 
for humanist intellectuals in Renaissance England was either to act as 
teachers of the studia humanitatis in the grammar school and universities, 
or else to serve as tutors and secretaries in the household of the gen-
try and nobility.” Malcolm adds: “He [Hobbes] was content to remain 
ments give us the idea Hobbes’ early encounter with the 
university was not very influential in his subsequent in-
tellectual development. At the least, the university did 
not cause an important change in his interests, readings, 
and, mainly, his way of life.15 
In fact, Hobbes’ earlier readings and the autobiographi-
cal references to them show that in the period from 1608 
to 1640 he had a typical humanist way of life and con-
cerns. After his education at Oxford, Hobbes was appoint-
ed in 1608 as tutor to the young William Cavendish, the 
second son of William Cavendish, then the first baron of 
Hardwick (Malcolm 1994). However, records and letters 
show Hobbes acted more as traveling companion and sec-
retary for the family than as tutor to the young earl. When 
Hobbes returned from his trip to the Continent serving 
the family, which ended in 1615, he devoted himself 
again to studying the works of the history, poetry, and 
grammar of the Roman and Greek classics, as he himself 
says in his Vita carminis: 
Thus I at ease did live, of books, whilst he
Did with all sorts supply my library.
Then I our own historians did peruse,
Greek, Latin, and convers’d too with my muse.
Homer and Virgil, Horace, Sophocles,
Plautus, Euripides, Aristophanes,
I understood, nay more; but of all these,
There’s none that pleas’d me like Thucydides.16
the employee or retainer of a great noble household –a somewhat old-
fashioned career pattern that gave him access to a higher social world 
without making him a member of it, and which kept him for months at 
a time in physical seclusion from the metropolitan intellectual scene” 
(Malcolm 2002, 2). To understand the emergence of new ways of life, 
with the independence of the Church and the universities, it is useful to 
consult Tuck (1998). On employment as tutor and servant of aristocratic 
families, vide ibid especially pages 11-15.
15 However, it was his education at Oxford and successful studies that 
gave Hobbes his first appointment as tutor in the Cavendish family. 
Cf. Aubrey (1998) and Malcolm (2002).
16 The English translation of the original Latin appeared a year after the 
publication of the latter in 1679. It has not been possible to identify 
the translator, but according to Curley, “there is reason to think that 
in some respects it is closer to Hobbes’ intentions than the Latin orig-
inal” (Curley 1994, xlvii). I quote it from Curley (1994). This is the Latin 
text: “Ille per hoc tempus mihi præbuit otia, libros/ Omnimodos stu-
diis præbuit ille meis./ Vertor ego ad nostras, ad Græcas, atque Latinas/ 
Historias; etiam carmina sæpe lego./ Flaccus, Virgilius, fuit e mihi 
notus Homerus, / Euripides, Sophocles, Plautus, Aristophanes,/ Plur-
esque; et Scriptores Historiarum;/ Sed mihi præ reliquis Thucydides 
plcauit” (Hobbes 1845, vol. 1, lxxxviii). A similar reference occurs in the 
Vita in prose: “Itaque cum in Anglia reversus esset, historicos et poetas 
(adhibitis gramaticorum celebrium commentariis) versavit diligenter; 
non ut floride, sed ut Latine posset scribere, et vim verborum cogitatis 
congruentem invenire; itaque verba disponere, ut lectio perspicua et 
facilis esset” (Hobbes 1845a). 
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According to this, it is not surprising that the most im-
portant production of this period is Hobbes’ translation 
of and comment on Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, pub-
lished in London in 1629. The translation, written during 
Hobbes’ service to the young earl, fulfills the demands 
of the humanist tradition regarding the reliability of the 
source—the best available Greek text—and the rhetorical 
rules for the introduction, following and quoting heav-
ily from Cicero. After a short interruption in the appoint-
ment to the Cavendish family, Hobbes returned to act as 
tutor to the third William Cavendish, earl of Devonshire. 
In this new period serving the family, Hobbes developed 
education strategies for the young earl that reveal Hobbes’ 
humanist tendencies: the choice of readings, exercises, 
and recommendations and his paraphrase and translation 
of Aristotle’s Rhetorica in particular, which can be consid-
ered another exercise in the humanist tradition. As a mat-
ter of fact, those two most important early works bear all 
the characteristics of the humanist tradition, in sharp 
opposition to the Scholastics and ‘new science’ topics and 
achievements, and can be considered typical exercises in 
the wider context of the English Renaissance.17 After cen-
tering his interests on civil philosophy and, in a wider con-
text, on the problems of the ‘new science,’ such as optics 
and mechanics, Hobbes was engaged in exercises typical 
of humanism. However, his new interests did not eclipse 
his old concerns. In fact, after some decades of being in-
volved in polemics about liberty, natural philosophy, and 
mathematics, after having published Leviathan and other 
influential works, Hobbes undertook his translation of 
Homer’s Odyssey and Iliad, the first published in 1673 under 
the title The Travels of Ulysses and the second published in 
1676 as Homer’s Iliads in English.18 According to this overview, 
we can see Hobbes was deeply engaged in humanist habits 
and exercises. From the sources of his works, we can also 
identify interesting elements concerning language. 
Hobbes’ humanist works  
and his conception of language
Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides’ Eight Books of the 
Peloponnesian War (Hobbes 1839–1845b) is indeed a sharp 
exercise in the humanist ideal that to master ars gram-
atica is to make translations of classical texts.19 But 
more than arguing in favor of the evident connection 
17 For further references on Hobbes’ early works, see Skinner (1996 
and 2002).
18 On the translation of Homer’s writings, see Martinich (2001).
19 See Skinner (1996) and Matz (2004).
between this work and the English Renaissance (a 
task very well done by Quentin Skinner),20 I am inter-
ested in showing in this section how in the Ancient 
resources employed in the introductory texts to this 
work we can identify antecedents to Hobbes’ earlier 
conceptions of language, particularly in the way it was 
first presented in Elements of Law and in Leviathan and 
later merged with the mathematical ideal of knowl-
edge in De Corpore. 
As I have mentioned, Skinner has carefully analyzed 
the interests and characteristics of Hobbes’ transla-
tion of Thucydides and has detailed the way Hobbes’ 
introduction and comments follow the rules of Eng-
lish Renaissance humanism regarding rhetoric. What 
is important for my argument is that, in so doing, 
Skinner has emphasized Hobbes’ early influence by 
Greek and Roman thinkers and particularly by Cicero. 
In fact, it is common to find Hobbes resorting in vir-
tually all his works to classical authors, either to de-
velop philosophical concepts from classical anecdotes 
and dictums21 or to illustrate and exemplify the use of 
his theories in classical writers22 or to forge English 
philosophical concepts, not only from Greek and Latin 
standard words but also from his specific usages.23 His 
recourse to Greek and Roman classics in his introduc-
tion to Thucydides’ War, “Of the Life and History of 
Thucydides,” however, aims to support his rhetorical 
20 Skinner’s (1996) analysis of the humanist characteristics of Hobbes’ 
translation, comments, and introduction of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian 
War is found in Reason and rhetoric in the philosophy of Hobbes.
21 The sharpest example of this is his introduction to De Cive: “It was 
the speech of the Roman people, to whom the name king had been 
rendered odious, as well by the tyranny of the Tarquians as by the 
genius and decretals of that city; it was the speech, I say, of the public, 
however pronouced from a private mouth (if yet Cato the censor were 
no more than such): that all kings are to be reckoned amongst ravenous beasts” 
(Hobbes 1991, 90). 
22 As it happens, for example, in Leviathan; when developing his conception 
of representation, Hobbes gives meaning to his point resorting to 
Cicero: “So that a person is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and 
in common conversation; and to personate is to act, or represent, himself or 
another; and he that acteth another is said to bear his person, or act 
in his name (in which sense Cicero useth it where he says Unus sustineo 
tres personas: mei, adversarii, et judicis, I bear three persons: my own, my 
adversary’s, and the judge’s)” (Hobbes 1994, 101). Note Hobbes’ quotation 
of Cicero comes from Cicero (1948, 102).
23 When defining imagination, Hobbes appeals to the common usages in 
the Latin and Greek traditions: “For after the object is removed, or the eye 
shut, we still remain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure 
than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call imagination, from the 
image made in seeing, and apply the same, though improperly, to all 
the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, 
and is as proper to one sense as to another. Imagination therefore is 
nothing but decaying sense, and is found in men and many other living 
creatures, as well sleeping as waking” (Hobbes 1994, 8).
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analysis of the work translated and, thus, to reinforce 
the ideal of Thucydides as the model for doing histo-
ry.24 I will not deal here with the possible continuity be-
tween those Greek and Roman authors and Hobbes’ own 
political ideas and categories. This has been done since 
Leo Strauss’s time, and recently with better material 
and more perspicuous analysis by Skinner, in the case 
of Cicero and Quintilian, and by Wilson, in the case of 
Epicurus and Lucretius.
The most salient feature of the ideals of Roman writ-
ers recovered by English Renaissance humanists, 
and quoted by Hobbes in the introductory texts of his 
translations, is that language is central in human 
life, in creating society and educating citizens.25 In 
fact, as we have seen, the English humanist ideal of 
education was founded on the Roman style according to 
which it was necessary to master the language (dicendi 
peritus), to be a cultivated man but also to become a cit-
izen in its broad sense, that is, a man endowed with 
civic virtues. However, these three elements cannot 
be considered independently because to the Roman 
writers the elements are closely related. Quintilian 
takes up this ideal from Cicero and expresses it plainly 
in his Institutiones Oratoria:
My aim, then, is the education of the perfect orator. 
The first essential for such a one is that he should be 
a good man, and consequently we demand of him not 
only the possession of the exceptional gifts of speech, 
but of all the excellences of character as well. For I 
will not admit that the principles of upright and hon-
ourable living should, as some have held, be regarded 
as the peculiar concern of philosophy. The man who 
can really play his part as a citizen and is capable of 
meeting the demands both of public and private busi-
ness, the man who can guide a state by his counsels, 
give it a firm basis by his legislation and purge its 
vices by his decisions as a judge, is assuredly no other 
than the orator of our quest. (Quintilian 1920a, 8–19). 
24 “It hath been noted by divers, that Homer in poesy, Aristotle in philos-
ophy, Demosthenes in eloquence, and others of the ancients in other 
knowledge, do still maintain their primacy (…) And in the number of 
these is justly ranked also our Thucydides; a workman no less perfect 
in his work, than any of the former; and in whom (…) the faculty of 
writing history is at the highest. For the principal and proper work 
of history being to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of 
actions past, to bear themselves prudently in the present and provi-
dently towards the future” (Hobbes 1839–1845b, viii). Note the parallel 
with Hobbes’ later conception of history as a kind of knowledge and 
the mechanical physiology that will support it.
25 See Blake (2003), Levin (2008) and Matz (2004).
The education of the citizen is, then, the education of 
the orator, who governs himself and, thus, who can 
govern the city. But how is language conceived in this 
context? We do not find an explicit reflection on the 
nature of language. Indeed, in Cicero as in Quintilian, 
the education of the orator is heavily based on reading 
history, poetry, and moral philosophy, but we have no 
definition of what language is. However, an impor-
tant statement at the beginning of De Oratore gives us 
an idea of the underlying conception of language that 
can be found in Cicero:
For the one point in which we have our very great-
est advantage over the brute creation is that we hold 
converse one with another, and can reproduce our 
thought in word. Who therefore would not rightly 
admire this faculty and deem it his duty to exert 
himself to the utmost in this field, that by so doing 
he may surpass men themselves in that particular 
respect wherein chiefly men are superior to ani-
mals? To come, however, at length to the highest 
achievements of eloquence, what other power could 
have been strong enough either to gather scattered 
humanity into one place, or to lead it out if its brutish 
existence in the wilderness up to our present condi-
tion of civilization as men and as citizens, or, after 
the establishment of social communities, to give 
shape to laws, tribunals, and civic rights? And not to 
pursue any further instances – well nigh countless as 
they are – I will conclude the whole matter in a few 
words, for my assertion is this: that the wise control 
of the complete orator is that which chiefly upholds 
not only his own dignity, but the safety of countless 
individuals and of the entire state (Cicero 1948, 24–27).
Cicero highlights, in the first sentence, that man can 
“hold converse one with another.” The idea that men 
are superior to other creatures because men possess 
language, and then, because they can understand 
themselves, is a recurrent topic that can be found at 
least since Aristotle. Indeed, in Politics (a text we know 
Hobbes read), Aristotle had claimed that “animals lead 
for the most part a life of nature, although in lesser 
particulars some are influenced by habit as well. Man 
has reason (lógos), in addition, and man only. For this 
reason nature, habit, reason must be in harmony with 
one another” (Aristotle 1984, 2114). What is different 
in Cicero, however, is that the accent on the conver-
sational character of man is not placed in the under-
standing and the agreement among men but in its 
“strong power to gather scattered humanity.” Language 
is powerful because it is able to elevate men from wil-
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derness to civilization and to reunite them under rules 
and laws. After claiming this, Cicero exposes a debate 
whether language is capable or not of creating society. 
His conclusion is that, in fact, language is responsible 
for gathering men in a coordinated way and for improv-
ing society in civilization (Cicero 1948, xvi).
After claiming this, Cicero adds that human superiority 
is due as well to our ability to “reproduce our thought in 
word” (quod exprimere dicendo sensa possumus). The single idea 
that language can reproduce our thoughts holds the full 
weight of the second part of the quotation. In this con-
text, the eloquence is but the development of this 
“power” that can be improved by resorting to the rhetori-
cal education. To understand this claim, we must look 
at the subsequent development of Cicero’s arguments. 
Next to this latter quotation, the dialogue in De oratore 
flows in discussing whether rhetoric is properly a field 
of knowledge or a mere ornament of speech, that is, if 
the orator requires some knowledge or if it is enough for 
him to know the formal rules of rhetoric to become an 
orator. Cassus, the speaker-man of Cicero in the follow-
ing dialogue, sheds light on this point:
The sole distinction will surely be that the good speak-
ers bring, as their peculiar possession, a style that is 
harmonious, graceful, and marked by a certain art-
istry and polish. Yet this style, if the underlying sub-
ject-matter be not comprehended and mastered by the 
speaker (si res non subest ab oratore precepta et cognita), must 
inevitably be of no account or even become the sport of 
universal derision. For what so effectually proclaims 
the madman as the hollow thundering of words – be 
they never so choice and resplendent – which have no 
thought or knowledge behind them? (nulla subiecta senten-
tia, nec scientia?) (Cicero 1948, xii)
Following this passage, to be eloquent is not only to dis-
course correctly according to the rules of rhetoric but 
also to do it about something well known. According 
to this view, there is no possible distinction between 
speaking correctly –that is, following the rules of rheto-
ric and speaking with sense– that is, about something 
well known. In this passage, a reinforcement of the the-
sis can be appreciated (and is emphasized in the Latin 
text) according to which language stands in the place 
of thoughts, and only if something underlies (subest) 
the words does the speech have sense and is persuasive. 
In fact, as is evident in the quotation from Quintilian, 
knowledge and moral topics are not “peculiar concern[s] 
of philosophy,” but are integral parts of the orator’s 
background and speech. In other words, knowledge and 
moral topics must be the endowment of his speech if he 
is going to be considered a man capable of thinking, a 
bearer of civic virtues, capable of leading society to civili-
zation, in short, an orator for Cicero.
These topics were important in Hobbes’ thought, and 
since his early works, we can find an assimilation and 
a reinterpretation of them. There is no doubt that these 
texts were well known to Hobbes.26 The idea that language 
distinguishes humans from animals because thanks to 
it we can create civilization, but also because we can 
reproduce our thoughts, is plainly presented in the 
opening sections of Leviathan concerning language:
[T]he most noble and profitable invention of all other 
was that of Speech, [in the Latin edition sermone] consist-
ing of names or appellations, and their connexion, whereby 
men register their thoughts, recall them when they are 
past, and also declare them one to another for mutual 
utility and conversation, without which there had been 
amongst men, neither common-wealth, nor society, 
nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, 
bears and wolves (Hobbes 1994, 15–16).
That language distinguishes humans from animals had 
been stated in a central position in The Elements, when 
claiming that, in sharp contrast with animals, humans 
had signs—voices or words—to recall past conceptions, 
and using signs, humans were capable of creating soci-
ety and sciences.27 
Thus, language is capable of gathering elements in a 
unit, as is the case of universal names: “One universal 
name is imposed on many things for their similitude 
in some quality or other accident; and whereas a prop-
er name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals 
26 In his introductory texts to Thucydides’ translation, for example, 
we find important quotations from Cicero’s main texts. From this, 
we can suppose Hobbes knew them in considerable detail. I think 
there is no need to mention the quotations again, which appear in 
subsequent works, such as De Cive or Leviathan, which can be read as 
the deep and persistent impact the Classical ideas had on it. 
27 Cf: “The experience we have hereof, is in such brute beasts, which, 
having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their 
meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where 
they hid it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger. 
But man, who in this point beginneth to advance himself above 
the nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of 
this defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined and devised to 
set up a visible or other sensible mark, the which when he seeth 
again, may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up 
[…] By the advantage of names it is that we are capable of science, 
which beasts, for want of them, are not” (Hobbes 1969, 1–4).
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recall any one of those many” (Hobbes 1994, 17).28 I will 
not emphasize the power of language to create soci-
ety; I consider Hobbes’ finest scholars have carefully 
worked this point.29 Notwithstanding my perspective 
in this research, it is important to note here, by the 
exigency of the argument, that Hobbes considered 
language a necessary condition for creating society, 
because this latter can only be founded upon a cove-
nant made with words between men. This is sharply 
expressed in the seventeenth chapter of Leviathan:
The only way to erect such a common power as may 
be able to defend them [men] from the invasion of for-
eigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to 
secure them in such sort as that by their own industry 
[…] is to confer all their power and strength upon one 
man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce 
all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, 
which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or 
assembly of men to bear their person, and every one to 
own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatso-
ever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause 
to be acted, in those things which concern to his will, 
and their judgement, to his judgement. This is more 
than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, 
in one and the same person, made by covenant of every 
man with every man, in such manner as if every man 
should say to every man I authorise and give up my right of 
governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this 
condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his 
actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united 
in one person is called a Commonwealth, in Latin, Civi-
tas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or 
rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God to 
which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and 
defence (Hobbes 1994, 109).
This often-quoted passage, read in the context of the power 
of language, can be seen as a development of the 
point stated by Cicero in De Oratore previously quoted. 
Indeed, Hobbes highlights how the Commonwealth, 
the foundation of society and civilization among men, 
rests upon the covenant and, thus, on the human abil-
ity to speak. But this is so because the covenant is not 
28 See also the most extended reflection in De Corpore: “And a common 
name, being the name of many things severally taken, but not 
collectively of all together (as man is not the name of all mankind, 
but of every one, as of Peter, John, and the rest severally) is therefore 
called an universal name” (Hobbes 1839–1845a, 19–20).
29 See, for example, Skinner (2007), Skinner (2002), Mintz (1962), Ryan 
(1996), Pettit (2008), Malcolm (2002), Zarka (1999), and Strauss (1996).
only a promise of “every man with every man”; it is 
also the foundation of a real unity, that is, the creation 
of the Commonwealth, understood as the erection of 
institutions entrusted to take care of men, guarantee-
ing their safety and welfare.30 Language, then, makes 
possible the creation of that artificial unit that gathers 
men “in one person.” 
Conclusion
The textual and contextual convergences between 
Hobbes and Renaissance humanism in England allow 
us to seriously consider certain strong links between 
points and arguments in Hobbes’ conception of lan-
guage and statements common in the classical mod-
els on which English humanism was founded. I think 
that the connections I have emphasized are not mere 
coincidences or putative relations, but traces of the 
intricate paths followed by modern thinkers in con-
structing early modern science and philosophy, in 
shaping that (new) comprehension of men, society, 
and nature during the Scientific Revolution. As I have 
previously pointed out, Hobbes can be considered a 
practitioner of Renaissance humanism, because of the 
humanists’ early contributions in the form of transla-
tions and comments; but also because he took up im-
portant humanist topics again and merged them into 
the language of the ‘new science’ up to a point to be 
almost invisible to our historical sight.
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